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Abstract
Controller Area Network (CAN) is a high-speed serial bus system with real-time capability. In this paper,
we present a formal model of the CAN bus protocol, mainly focusing on the arbitration process, transmission
process, and fault conﬁnement mechanism. Moreover, 11 important properties are formalized in terms of
the protocol. Based on the veriﬁcation tool UPPAAL, we describe the system model and properties for
performing veriﬁcation work of the CAN bus protocol. The veriﬁcation results indicate that some properties
are not satisﬁed in CAN bus system, most of which are caused by the starvation and bus-oﬀ nodes. On
this basis, the dynamic priority scheduling algorithm and bus-oﬀ recovery mechanism are applied, which
indicates that some problems can be solved on the application layer.
Keywords: CAN bus protocol, Timed automata, Fault conﬁnement, Application layer
1 Introduction
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a high-speed serial bus system with real-
time capabilities, widely used in embedded systems. CAN bus was ﬁrst developed
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by Bosch company [4] and then established as the international standard in ISO
11898 [5]. Multi-master broadcasting is the key feature of this serial bus system.
All nodes can transmit data when the bus is free, and the collision of multiple
simultaneous transmissions is solved by priority-based arbitration algorithm. The
identiﬁer of a message resolves the priority. A transmitter broadcasts a message
to all nodes and each node decides whether the data is relevant according to the
identiﬁer received. One main feature is fault conﬁnement mechanism. Each con-
troller of CAN detects errors and takes appropriate measures to guarantee the data
consistency and reliability. The interframe space is another characteristic. Data
and remote frames are separated from the previous frame by an interframe space,
during which no node has access to the bus. CAN bus is widely used in safety
critical automotive electronics due to its real-time capability, low cost and reliable
error conﬁning mechanism.
To ensure the correctness of CAN protocol, formal methods based on the rigorous
mathematical theory could be an eﬀective and practical approach. The adoption
of formal notations with a deﬁned mathematical meaning enables the model to be
expressed with precision and unambiguity. The properties that the protocol should
exhibit can be represented in mathematical framework as well. Thus the correctness
can be checked via exploring all states and transitions or mathematical proof. There
are also some automatic or interactive tools to facilitate the process like SPIN [2],
NuSMV [12], UPPAAL [14],Coq [3] among many other excellent tools.
CAN follows the abstract Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference model,
and its protocol mainly deﬁnes the data link layer. In the ﬁrst place, we present
a formal model of the CAN protocol and the veriﬁcation results of its properties
based on timed automata [17]. We employ UPPAAL to model the CAN system
and implement not only the arbitration process and the transmission process, but
also the fault conﬁnement mechanism and the interframe space characteristic. Be-
sides, 11 important properties extracted from the CAN standard are also veriﬁed
in UPPAAL.
In a CAN system, the application layer is open for users to deﬁne explicit al-
gorithms according to their requirements. In fact, most of the errors in the CAN
protocol can be avoided by the eﬀective algorithms on the application layer. To
show how this works and get more accurate veriﬁcation results, we also integrate
the algorithms on application layer into our models. Among various scheduling al-
gorithms, we choose the representative dynamic priority scheduling algorithm. It
means a message has both a static priority and a dynamic priority, and the dy-
namic priority can be promoted according to the times it fails in the arbitration.
The dynamic priorities are compared prior to the static priorities, which greatly
shortens the response time. Also, to keep the system from being deadlock, the
nodes becoming bus-oﬀ state are usually reset. The bus-oﬀ recovery mechanism
is applied after introducing the model of application layer. The inﬂuences on the
system performance and properties are discussed and analyzed as well.
The paper is organized as follow. In section 2, a brief introduction to CAN data
link layer is presented. Section 3 models the whole structure of CAN bus protocol,
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and then shows the four submodels. Section 4 presents the properties and the
veriﬁcation results, including the analysis. Additionally, in section 5, we illustrate
the modeling process of application layer and show the changes to the veriﬁcation
results. Comparison with related work and conclusion are given in section 6 and
section 7, respectively.
2 CAN Bus Protocol
The CAN network follows the abstract Open System Interconnection (OSI) refer-
ence model. This section gives a brief introduction to the data link layer of CAN,
in which the main services are implemented. We introduce frame formats, arbitra-
tion mechanism, fault conﬁning mechanism, and the interframe space. In a CAN
network, N nodes are connected to a serial bus, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Any node
can start to transmit a message when the bus is idle.
2.1 Frame Formats
The frame is the transmission unit of data link layer. In the CAN protocol, there
are four types of frames. The data frame and remote frame transmit messages while
error frame and overload frame broadcast signals.
     
	

Fig. 1. CAN Bus Architecture
Data frame is the standard message format. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the SOF
indicates the start of the frame. The arbitration ﬁeld contains an identiﬁer, and
an RTR bit which indicates whether the message is a remote request. The control
ﬁeld speciﬁes the data length, while the data ﬁeld stores the actual content. A CRC
sequence is contained in the CRC ﬁeld to check the integrity of a received message.
The ACK ﬁeld acknowledges that the transmitted message is successfully received
by at least one of the nodes. The 7-bit EOF marks the end of the frame. The
remote frame is a message sent by any node to request another node to send a data
frame with the identical identiﬁer. It diﬀers from data frame format in that the
RTR bit marks as 0, and the data ﬁeld is empty.
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Fig. 2. Frame Format
The error frame is composed of two ﬁelds. The ﬁrst is the error ﬂag, which is 6
consecutive dominant (error-active node) or recessive (error-passive node) bits. The
second is the error delimiter, with a ﬁxed format of 8 consecutive recessive bits. But
the recessive bits can be submerged by dominant bits sent to the bus at the same
time. Any node can broadcast an overload message to delay the next transmission.
Its format is the same as the active error frame, but the overload frame only occurs
right after the last bit of EOF, while the error frame may occur whenever an error
is detected.
2.2 Arbitration
The method used to solve the collision is the Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) mechanism. All nodes constantly monitor the bus in time.
The nodes attempting to send messages start to write to the bus bit by bit when
the bus is idle. The dominant bit (0) overwrites the recessive bit (1), which means
zero has the higher priority. The data monitored on the bus is compared with the
data sent by a transmitter. If one node sends a recessive bit but reads back a domi-
nant bit, it means some other nodes are transmitting messages with higher priority
identiﬁers. This node stops sending bits and immediately switches to listening-only
mode.
2.3 Fault conﬁnement
Messages with errors should be discarded and retransmitted when the bus turns to
idle again. Fault conﬁnement mechanism is proposed to stop a node which causes
too many faults from developing into a permanent malfunction. A transmit error
counter (TEC) and a receive error counter (REC) are assigned to every node. If the
transmitter detects an error, the corresponding TEC increases, while the receiver
detecting an error increases its REC. The RECs of all nodes receiving an error frame
also increase. However, if a message is successfully transmitted and received, the
TEC of the transmitter and the REC of receivers decrease. A node starts in the
error-active state with its counters initialized to zero. If any TEC or REC reaches a
certain value (128), the node enters the error-passive state, in which a node is unable
to broadcast an error ﬂag but writing to the bus is still possible if no error-active
node wishes to write to the bus. If the TEC of a node reaches the maximum value
(256), the node should be disconnected from the network. The node can return to
the network only via a software reset.
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2.4 Interframe space
Data frames and remote frames should be separated from preceding frames by a ﬁeld
called interframe space. But overload frames and error frames shall not be preceded
by it. The interframe space contains the bit ﬁelds intermission (three recessive bits).
But for error-passive nodes which have been the transmitter of the previous frames,
eight recessive bits shall be sent following the intermission before trying to transmit
its next message. However, the error-active node and the error-passive node that
is not the transmitter of the previous message do not need to wait, which means
these nodes may have already granted access during that period. The bus becomes
idle after the interframe space, during which any node may access the bus.
3 Modeling
In our models, we use UPPAAL to model the speciﬁcation of CAN bus protocol.
In this section, we only model the CAN bus and its properties based on the ISO
standard. However, to analyze its performance on the application layer, we further
apply the dynamic priority algorithm and the bus-oﬀ recovery mechanism and verify
the properties in the next section.
3.1 UPPAAL
UPPAAL is an integrated tool environment for modeling, simulation and veriﬁcation
of realtime systems [13]. It is not only suitable for automatic veriﬁcation of safety
and bounded liveness properties of networks of timed automata, but also appropriate
for systems that can be modeled as a collection of non-deterministic processes with
ﬁnite control structure and real-valued clocks, communicating through channels or
shared variables. The simulator in UPPAAL is a validation tool which enables
examination of possible dynamic executions of a system. The UPPAAL model
checker can check invariant and reachability properties by exploring the state-space
of a system.
Also, it is allowed to declare clock variables to record continuous time in UP-
PAAL. Four clock variables are introduced to respectively express the bits in the
delay of overload and the interframe space after a successful transmission or the
error frame.
3.2 Framework
Models can be divided into controller, arbitration, and transceiver, as shown in
Fig. 3. There is only one controller in the whole system which is responsible for
the synchronization of transactions between models, as well as the trigger of error
frame and overload frame. The arbitration mainly deals with deciding the winner
of the arbitration based on the message priority. And the transceiver is used to
model the message sending and receiving, errors handling and the interframe space.
There is one arbitration model and one transceiver model for every single node.
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Fig. 3. The overall framework of all three models
In the controller model, the transaction processes are controlled and coordinated
by variables and channels. During the phrase of reading and writing the message,
an error frame may be generated if any error occurs. Moreover, the overload frame
may be generated by nodes requesting a delay of the next transmission.
The arbitration solves the collision based on the message priority. Either data
frame or remote frame can be randomly generated at ﬁrst, then the identiﬁers
of messages attempting to be transmitted will be compared. Once the winner is
decided, the transmission process starts, which is synchronized by channels. Fur-
thermore, the arbitration also deals with the problem of error-passive nodes trying
to send the next message.
In the transceiver, the node winning the arbitration starts to send data to the
bus, while others listen to the bus. When any error randomly occurs in any node,
a signal will be sent to controller, which enforces an error frame to be broadcasted.
All nodes receiving the error ﬂag increase their error counters. Analogously, the
overload frame will be broadcast before interframe space if any node requests it.
In this CAN model, there are three nodes named 0, 1, 2 which transmit messages
with identiﬁers 1, 2, 3 respectively. In a practical CAN system, the data is sent
bit by bit, and monitored at the same time. However, to abstract the process, the
frame is simpliﬁed as an integer, representing the identiﬁer of a frame. In addition,
the bus is declared as an integer variable bus, and the writing and reading process
of data is abstracted as the assignment to the bus variable and the reading from it.
3.3 Controller
The controller is shown in Fig. 4. This model synchronizes with the arbitra-
tion models and the transceiver models. The controller starts in the idle state,
which means the bus is free. When a node is sending a message, the controller
synchronizes with the arbitration by the channel send[id]. The controller waits
until the comparison of message priorities starts and sends a synchronization signal
(start arbitration!).
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Fig. 4. Controller Model
During the reading process, one or more errors may occur. The controller
triggers the channel error[id] as soon as any error is detected and the array
error detect[id] turns to 1. The occurrence of error, as well as the the broadcast
of an error frame, is illustrated in the transceiver model. (See Section 3.5)
After the EOF of a frame, any node can send an overload frame to request a
delay of next transmission. Once the array over[id] is set to 1, the global variable
delay is set to 1 as well, indicating the broadcast to all nodes. (See section 3.5)
During a whole transmission process, an ideal situation is that a message is
successfully sent and received by all nodes and all nodes return to the idle state.
However, errors may occur during the transmitting process, after which an error
signal is broadcast. In addition, an overload frame may be sent and broadcast so
that all nodes wait for additional time before the start of next transmission process.
After all these processes are completed, all nodes return to the idle state and prepare
for the next transmission.
3.4 Arbitration Model
The arbitration process is implemented in the arbitration model of each node. The
initial location is idle, which means that a node doesn’t attempt to send any
message. The variable i is in {1, 2} (e.g. i:int[1, 2]), donating which kind of
frame will be sent. If i=1, this node sends a data frame, otherwise (i=2) it sends
a remote frame. The synchronization with the controller is done by the channel
send[id], which means that the node id is sending a message with its corresponding
identiﬁer. As soon as the channel start arbitration is triggered, all nodes pending
for transmitting messages at the same time are competing, which is implemented
in the function compare(). After the winner is decided, each node compares its
own identifer with the winner’s identiﬁer. The node winning the arbitration jumps
to request success state, while others jump to request denied state. All nodes
return to the idle state once the transaction is ﬁnished, which is coordinated by the
channel trans completed[id].
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Fig. 5. Arbitration Model
In CAN system, it is speciﬁed that an error-passive node which is the transmitter
of the previous message should wait for additional time during the interframe space
before sending the next new message, during which other error-active nodes or
error-passive node that is not the transmitter of previous message may gain access
to the bus. In other words, this error-passive node can successfully transmit its next
message only if no others are trying to transmit messages in this period. To illustrate
this process, The array error passive[N] is declared. The error passive[id] is
set to 1 when node [id] is in an error-passive state. In arbitration model, each
node ﬁrstly checks whether it is in error-passive state and also happens to be the
transmitter of the previous message. If so, the corresponding node jumps to the
waiting state. If there are other nodes trying to transmit messages at the same
time, the node in the waiting state fails to take part in the competition for bus
after the completion of the interframe space. However, when this node is the only
one trying to transmit, it grants the access to the bus. The procedure of arbitration
is shown in Fig. 5.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.3, every node has its own TEC (transmit
error counter) and REC (receive error counter). To simplify these two error counters,
in our models we declare only one variable error counter to represent them as a whole
in order to reduce the system complexity and the number of reachable traces. It’s
worth mentioning that as the two error counters share the same characteristics, our
abstraction is reasonable and has no side-eﬀects on the veriﬁcation results. The
error counter of a node is increased no matter the error is a transmitting error or
a receiving error. When the error counter of a node reaches the maximum limit, it
turns to bus-oﬀ state.
In this arbitration model, the identiﬁers of nodes requesting to send messages
are arbitrated to decide which node can transmit its data. Furthermore, if an
error-passive node has sent a message, it should wait for additional time before
continuously sending another message. Once the error counter of a node reaches
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the maximum limit, it skips to state busOff in this model as well.
3.5 Transceiver Model
The transceiver is shown in Fig. 6. After arbitration process, the sending and receiv-
ing process, as well as the error handling and interframe space are all implemented
in the transceiver model of each node.
The node winning the arbitration starts to send data to the bus once the local
channel win[id] is triggered, while others receive the message. In the local function
reading(), all nodes, including the transmitter itself, respectively assign the value
of bus to its own local variable read. If all nodes receive the message successfully,
the channel trans ok will be triggered, which means the end of frame. In addition,
on receiving a remote frame, the node requested will prepare a data frame with the
corresponding identiﬁer and take part in the competition for bus access.
During the transmission, errors may occur. This situation is modeled by two
alternative traces, through one of which data can be read successfully, while the
other generates an error. Once error detect[id] is set to 1, error signal is broad-
cast by the error[id] channel in controller. After an error ﬂag is signaled, the
value of bus is equal to the error frame. All nodes detect the error signal on the
bus and immediately discard the value of read variable, and at the same time the
error counters of all nodes increase by 1. If the message is successfully sent and
received, error counters of all nodes decrease on the other hand. It is worth men-
tioning that, if only the error-passive nodes detect the error while no error-active
nodes do, the error cannot be known by others because an error-passive node is
unable to broadcast an error ﬂag. The fault conﬁnement process can be illustrated
in Fig. 7. As shown, all nodes are initialized from error-active state. As long as
any node has detected an error, its error counter will be increased. And all nodes
receiving the error frame increase their error counters too. On the other hand, if
a frame is successfully transmitted, the error counter of the transmitter decreases
(but not less than 0). Similarly, after a successful reception of a frame, the error
counters of receivers decrease. The counters are usually increased or decreased by
one, but sometimes by eight. The detailed principles are speciﬁed in the proto-
col. The error-active node will turn to error-passive state when its error counter
reaches a certain value. However, one may return to error-active state when the
error counter drops within limit. If the error-counter ﬁnally reaches the maximum
limit, the node will be bus-oﬀ and can neither send nor receive any message. In
a real CAN system the bus-oﬀ node is able to return to the system only through
user request and 128 occurrences of 11 consecutive recessive bits.
In this model, the variable error counter is declared to record the errors. The
error counters of all nodes are initiated to 0. For every node, on receiving the error
frame, the variable error counter will increase by 1. However, if no error occurs,
all nodes decrease their error counters in function error counter decrease(id).
If the error counter reaches 4, the error passive[id] is set to 1, turning to
error-passive state. Of course, the error counters will decrease if a message is
successfully sent and received. And the error passive[id] can be set to 0 once the
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Fig. 6. Transceiver Model
error counter is less than 4. But a node turns to bus-oﬀ state if its error counter
reaches 8. We assume the maximum limits for error-active nodes and error-passive
nodes to be 4 and 8 respectively in order to simplify the models. For a bus-oﬀ node,
the channel busoff[id] is triggered.
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Fig. 7. Fault Conﬁnement
After the EOF, the node requesting a delay of the next frame should immediately
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send a overload frame next to it. On receiving the overload frame, all nodes should
broadcast six dominant bits too, which means there can be 12 consecutive dominant
bits. The overload delimiter follows the overload ﬂags, consisting of eight recessive
bits. After sending an overload ﬂag, every node shall monitor the bus until it detects
a recessive bit. At this point, all nodes realize that the overload ﬂag is completed,
and then start sending seven more recessive bits simultaneously, to complete the
eight-bit-long overload delimiter. If no nodes need to send a overload frame, the
EOF is followed by the interframe space. As shown in Fig. 8, the interframe
space is a ﬁeld used to separate data frame or remote frame from the preceding
frames, consisting of intermission and bus idle. But the error-passive node, which is
the transmitter of the previous transmission, should wait for additional suspension
ﬁeld (8 bits) before sending the next message. The process has been speciﬁed in
arbitration.
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Fig. 8. Interframe Space
The model can randomly choose whether any node requests an overload frame
before returning to idle state. Once the variable delay is set to 1, the overload
frame (6 time units) will be produced and broadcast, followed by the interframe
space (3 time units). When no overload frame is sent, the interframe space is
transmitted right after the completion of EOF and before next data or remote
frame.
4 Properties and Veriﬁcation Results
For the purpose of verifying whether the models obey the speciﬁcations and re-
quirements of CAN protocol, 11 properties based on the standard are proposed. All
these properties are speciﬁed using UPPAAL property speciﬁcation language. The
veriﬁcation results and analysis are provided as well.
4.1 Properties
Among all the eleven properties, eight of them are explicitly extracted from section 6
of ISO 11898-1 standard, while the remaining three properties are implicitly derived
from this protocol. These properties can be divided into 3 categories, which are
safety, liveness and invariant.
(i) Safety
Deadlock free (DF): The system will never be in a deadlock state. It is
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essential to verify whether the system is deadlock free as the deadlock of any
single node will lead to data loss or even system breakdown. It can be speciﬁed
as
A[] not deadlock
For all paths the system will never be deadlock. Deadlock is a primitive in
UPPAAL language used to check whether the system can be in deadlock state.
(ii) Liveness
Starvation Freedom (SF): Every node attempting to write a message to the
bus eventually succeeds in doing so. This property is not explicitly mentioned
in protocol, but it is important to ensure the starvation freedom property in
a real-time network because the messages need to be sent eventually without
loss. It can be speciﬁed as
arbitration(N). arbitrating --> arbitration(N). request success
If the state arbitrating is reached, eventually the state request success will
be reached in the arbitration model of node N.
Remote Data Request (RDR): If a node sends a remote frame, eventually
it will receive the message requested. This property is derived from section 6.7
of the CAN standard. It can be speciﬁed as
request[N]==2-->transceiver(N). read==N
If remote[N] is set to 2 (which means the message is a remote frame), then the
variable read in transceiver(N) will eventually be N. In other words, when
node N requests a message of the same identiﬁer, it will ﬁnally receive one.
Error Signaling (ES): Corrupted frames can always be ﬂagged by any node
detecting the errors. This property is derived from section 6.9 of the CAN
standard. It can be speciﬁed as
transceiver(N). error signaling -->bus==error frame
If the error signaling state in transceiver[N] is reached, the bus value will
be the value of error frame.
Error passive (EP): An error-passive node shall not send an active error
ﬂag. This property is derived from section 6.14 of the CAN standard. It can
be speciﬁed as
A<>not(error passive[N]==1 and transceiver(N). error signaling
and transceiver(N). error broadcast)
For all possible transition sequences eventually there is not any time at which
error passive[N] is 1, and both error signaling and error broadcast
states are reached in transceiver(N).
Error active (EA): An error-active node shall normally take part in bus
communication and send an error ﬂag when an error has been detected. This
property is derived from section 6.13 of the CAN standard. It can be speciﬁed
as
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A<>not(error passive[N]==0 and transceiver(N). error signaling
and not transceiver(N). error broadcast)
For all possible transition sequences eventually it can not be at the same time
when error passive[N] is 0 and error signaling state is reached while the
error broadcast cannot be reached in transceiver(N).
Data Consistency (DC): A frame is simultaneously accepted either by all
nodes or by no node at all. This property is derived from section 6.6 of the
CAN standard. It can be speciﬁed as
A<>not(bus off[N]==0 and bus==error frame and
transceiver(N).read!=error frame)
For all possible transition sequences eventually there is not any time at which
bus off[N] is 0 and bus is equal to the value of error frame, but the variable
read in transceiver (N) is not equal to the value of error frame.
Automatic Retransmission (AR): A node that has transmitted a corrupted
message will attempt to retransmit the message when the bus becomes idle.
This property is derived from section 6.11 of the CAN standard. It can be
speciﬁed as
transceiver(N). error signaling-->transceiver(N). idle
If error signaling state in transceiver (N) is reached, the idle state in
transceiver (N) will then be reached.
(iii) Invariant
Bus Access Method (BAM): The highest-priority message gains access to
the bus. This property is derived from section 6.3 of the CAN standard, to
verify that it is always the highest-priority message that gains access to the
bus. It can be speciﬁed as
A[] (winner<=mid3 and winner<=mid2 and winner<=mid1)or
winner==idle
For all paths the value of winner is always smaller than or equal to mid1, mid2
and mid3, otherwise winner is equal to idle.
Bus Oﬀ (BO): any node whose error counter reaches the max limit will
eventually be bus-oﬀ. This property is derived from section 6.15 of the CAN
standard, to verify whether any node will be bus-oﬀ. It can be speciﬁed as
E<> transceiver(N). bus off and arbitration(N). busOff
There possibly exists a path through which bus off state in transceiver (N)
will be reached, as well as the busOff state in arbitration (N).
Identiﬁer Disjointness (ID): It is impossible that an arbitration takes place
between data messages having identical identiﬁers. This property is mentioned
in the standard that CAN system cannot solve the collision of two messages
with the same identiﬁer. So it is veriﬁed to ensure identiﬁer exclusion. It can
be speciﬁed as
A<> mid1!=mid2 and mid2!=mid3 and mid3!=mid1
C. Pan et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 309 (2014) 31–49 43
For all possible transition sequences eventually mid1, mid2 and mid3 diﬀer from
each other.
There are the other four properties in section 6 of the standard that are not
veriﬁed in our models, which are ’frames’, ’information routing’, ’system ﬂexibility’
and ’error detection’. ’Frames’ indicates that the information on the bus shall be
sent in ﬁxed format and limited length. And ’error detection’ indicates that ﬁve
diﬀerent kinds of errors can be detected. However since the frame format in our
models are simpliﬁed and the occurrence of errors are randomly triggered, there is
no need to verify these two properties. ’Information routing’ means information is
not transmitted by the conﬁguration of nodes’ addresses. Instead, receivers decide
whether to accept messages based on acceptance ﬁltering. The ’system ﬂexibility’
means nodes may be added to the CAN network without requiring any change in
the software or hardware of any node. We do not verify these two properties in this
model because they are satisﬁed in physical layer. Moreover, the properties EP, EA
and DC are speciﬁed with A<> not p format because the nest statement structure,
for example A<> p--> q, is not supported in UPPAAL speciﬁcation language.
4.2 Veriﬁcation results and analysis
The results of veriﬁcation are shown in Table 1. An entry of YES indicates that
the property has passed the veriﬁcation and holds for CAN bus while NO indicates
otherwise. Among all these 11 properties, 6 of them do not hold for CAN models.
Category Property Name Veriﬁcation Result
Safety DF NO
Liveness SF NO
Liveness RDR NO
Liveness ES NO
Liveness EP YES
Liveness EA YES
Liveness DC YES
Liveness AR NO
Invariant BAM NO
Invariant BO YES
Invariant ID YES
Table 1
Veriﬁcation Results
By observing and analysing the diagnostic traces generated in the simulator of
UPPAAL, we give the reasons why some properties can not pass the veriﬁcation.
First of all, we ﬁnd out that models are deadlocked when all nodes reach the
bus-oﬀ state. With the increase of the error counter, all nodes may eventually be in
the bus-oﬀ state, unable to send or receive any message, which leads to the failure
of DF.
As for the SF, a node may never win the arbitration and successfully send its
message when there are always other nodes sending messages of higher identiﬁers at
the same time. A node attempting to send a message may never succeed because of
its low priority. That is why this property fails the veriﬁcation. The RDR cannot
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pass the veriﬁcation when the requested node happens to be in the bus-oﬀ state
before it can reply to the remote request. Another reason is the starvation problem
of low priority messages as we mentioned above. If the requested message is of low
priority, it always waits for the bus access before it can be successfully transmitted.
Similarly, another property AR cannot pass the veriﬁcation for the same reasons as
RDR as illustrated above.
Due to the fact that an error-passive node can not broadcast an error, the ES
doesn’t hold as well. According to the behavior rules of error-passive nodes, they can
only send the passive error signal, which can be overlapped by other dominant bits.
So the errors cannot always be signaled. Also, if an error-passive node happens to
be the transmitter of the previous message and tries to send the next message, while
other nodes are accessing bus at the same time, it may lose the arbitration even if
it holds the highest priority identiﬁer, thus the BAM fails to pass the veriﬁcation.
From the analysis of the results, we conclude that there are three main factors
that lead to the failure of some properties. One is due to the low priority of identiﬁer
that results in the starvation. Another is caused by nodes becoming in the error-
passive state. The last one is that the nodes in bus-oﬀ state will not take part in
further communication.
In summary, the event-triggered and priority-based mechanisms of CAN lead
to the starvation problem. To solve the problem, Time Triggered Controller Area
Network (TTCAN) [6] [9] [10] can be used as it is time-triggered. Another problem
results from the fault conﬁnement mechanism. This mechanism is designed to ensure
performance reliability and stop ill-performed nodes from sending and receiving
messages. However, the veriﬁcation results indicate that the error-passive and bus-
oﬀ nodes may cause the data loss or data inconsistency.
5 Application layer
The application layer is not explicitly deﬁned for CAN bus. It is open for users
to deﬁne their own algorithms according to the characteristics of the system when
using CAN bus. To make it closer to the real systems and get more accurate results
of the veriﬁcation, in this section, we integrate algorithms in the application layer to
the models mentioned above. The deﬁnition of the application layer is complicated,
but considering the characteristics of our models as well as the properties we want
to verify, here we mainly focus on the message scheduling algorithm and the nodes’
recovery mechanism.
5.1 Modeling the application layer
There are some diﬀerent scheduling algorithms such as dynamic scheduling [16] [1]
and earliest deadline ﬁrst [11]. Among all these frequently used algorithms, the dy-
namic priority scheduling is one of the most popular and representative algorithms.
Compared with the single identiﬁer-based priority, the dynamic scheduling algo-
rithm assigns two priority levels to a message. As we can see in Fig. 9, one priority
is the static priority, which is the same as the message identiﬁer. The other one is
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dynamic priority. The dynamic priority equals to the static priority initially. How-
ever, with the increase of failure times of arbitration, the dynamic priority can be
promoted. When two or more nodes are accessing the bus at the same time, their
dynamic priorities are ﬁrstly compared, and the message of the highest dynamic
priority gains access to the bus regardless of the static priority. When the messages
have the same dynamic priority, the arbitration is done based on the static priority.
1" #1  #1/0
Fig. 9. Dynamic message ID
In our models, the algorithm is applied to the arbitration model by
a function called dynamic compare(). Two variables failure counter and
dynamic priority are declared for each node. We assume that the dynamic prior-
ity is promoted by one when the failure counter reaches three, which means the
message has lost the arbitration for three times. When the message ﬁnally gains
access to the bus, the failure counter is reset to zero and the dynamic priority
turns back to the initial number.
The bus-oﬀ recovery mechanism requires the node becoming bus-oﬀ to recover
as fast as it can to ensure the communication to be unblocked. However, in real
system, it takes a short period of time for nodes to recover and causes a delay, so
in our models, we assume that the bus-oﬀ node is reset in a certain period of time
units. This period is declared by the variable recovery time, but the speciﬁc value
is determined by the physical medium.
5.2 Veriﬁcation results
The veriﬁcation results shown in section 4 indicates that six properties do not hold
for the previous models. But when applied with the dynamic priority scheduling
algorithm and the bus-oﬀ recovery mechanism, four of them are solved, which are
DF, SF, RDR and AR. Table 2 shows the veriﬁcation results of these six properties
before and after adding the application layer. The failure of DF results from the
Category Property Name Protocol Model Application Model
Safety DF NO YES
Liveness SF NO YES
Liveness RDR NO YES
Liveness ES NO NO
Liveness AR NO YES
Invariant BAM NO NO
Table 2
Comparison of veriﬁcation results
nodes being bus-oﬀ, so with the recovery mechanism, the system will not deadlock.
And as the SF, RDR and AR do not pass the veriﬁcation due to the low message
priority and bus-oﬀ problem, the dynamic priority scheduling algorithm can avoid
these problems.
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As for the ES and BAM, they cannot pass the veriﬁcation because of the error-
passive nodes. The ES refers to the property that errors can always be ﬂagged by
nodes detecting them. But according to the protocol, if only error-passive nodes
detect the errors, the error ﬂag cannot be broadcast. Similarly, the BAM does not
hold for the implementation model because of the same reason we mentioned in
section 4.2, the error-passive nodes cannot continuously send two frames regardless
of its message priority.
From the analysis above, we can conclude that the critical problems occurred in
the data link layer can be partially solved by designing algorithms in the application
layer. With regard to the error-passive nodes, the fault conﬁnement mechanism
is designed to stop the badly-behaved nodes from disturbing the communication.
When a node makes too many mistakes, it is thought to be error-prone and measures
are taken to make it transmit as less messages as possible. Our models are just
strictly following the actual behavior rules of the error-passive nodes. The fault
conﬁnement mechanism tries to avoid the disturbance of badly-behaved nodes, but
meanwhile some side eﬀects may be brought out, such as the fact that the limitations
to the behaviors of error-passive nodes may lead to data loss and data inconsistency.
6 Related work
As CAN bus is widely used in many automotive electronic systems, various ap-
proaches to verify its safety and reliability are proposed like [13], [8], [7], [15], etc.
UPPAAL model is used in [13] to verify that their solution for clock synchroniza-
tion over CAN achieves the desired precision even in the presence of various nodes
and channels faults. The formal veriﬁcation also shows that inconsistent channel
faults are a severe threat to the clock precision, but their negative impacts can be
reduced by choosing a suitable resynchronization period. And [8] focuses on the
implementation of a functional coverage library in SystemC and only applies it on
the veriﬁcation of a CAN bus as a case study.
In [7], the authors use timed automata to verify CAN bus. Models mainly in-
clude arbitration process and transmission process without errors. Four properties
are veriﬁed such as the deadlock freedom and starvation. In addition, they carry
out experiments on the response time of sending messages. However, some circum-
stances are not covered in their models. Besides, as the models are not complete,
the properties veriﬁed are limited. Our method involves some scenarios under which
errors and overload requests may occur, which is close to real situations. Moreover,
the fault conﬁnement mechanism and the interframe space, as the main features of
CAN, are also implemented in our approach. Some properties are veriﬁed during the
fault conﬁnement process, such as the data inconsistency resulted from the inability
of error-passive nodes to signal errors. The ﬁnite-state veriﬁcation project [15] uses
ﬁnite-state analysis for veriﬁcation. The work focuses on the three diﬀerent kinds of
controller chips widely used. All these three controller chips are modeled, veriﬁed
and analyzed respectively. Although more properties are veriﬁed than before, the
modeling process is not well explained and much attention is paid to the various
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kinds of controller chips. What’s more, the overload frame and the interframe space
are not included in their method.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, models of CAN bus protocol are presented, and 11 properties are
veriﬁed based on the models. The results indicate that the main problems of CAN
bus system are deadlock, starvation, and data inconsistency. The starvation is a
consequence of event-triggered and priority-based mechanism, which leads to the
starvation of messages with lower priority. Another problem results from the fault
conﬁnement mechanism. This mechanism is designed to ensure performance relia-
bility and stop ill-performed nodes from sending and receiving messages, but in some
special occasions it may cause the data loss or data inconsistency. Nevertheless, by
applying the dynamic priority scheduling algorithm and bus-oﬀ recovery mecha-
nism, we can see that the problems mentioned can be partly solved in application
layer.
In the future, we will research on modeling and veriﬁcation of the probability
of CAN communication. As we mentioned before, some properties do not hold due
to the occurrence of some incidents. The proposal of probability models can better
model the real situation of the system. For example, the errors in our models are
randomly triggered, however, the probability of the occurrence of errors can be
calculated, and integrated in the models. Then properties could be veriﬁed on such
probability models, which is more accurate and close to real situation.
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